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ABSTRACT
Most social networking platforms protect user’s private in-
formation by limiting access to it to a small group of mem-
bers, typically friends of the user, while allowing (virtually)
everyone’s access to the user’s public data. In this paper,
we exploit public data available on Facebook to infer users’
undisclosed interests on their proﬁle pages. In particular, we
infer their undisclosed interests from the public data fetched
using Graph APIs provided by Facebook. We demonstrate
that simply liking a Facebook page does not corroborate
that the user is interested in the page. Instead, we per-
form sentiment-oriented mining on various attributes of a
Facebook page to determine the user’s real interests. Our
experiments conducted on over 34,000 public pages collected
from Facebook and data from volunteers show that our in-
ference technique can infer interests that are often hidden by
users on their personal proﬁle with moderate accuracy. We
are able to disclose 22 interests of a user and ﬁnd more than
80,097 users with at least 2 interests. We also show how
this inferred information can be used to break a preference
based backup authentication system.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.4.6 [Security and Protection]: Authentication; H.2.4
[Systems]: Textual databases
General Terms
Security
Keywords
Facebook; preference based authentication; Graph API; se-
mantic analysis
1. INTRODUCTION
With the rise of online social networks (OSNs), more and
more personal information of users is available on the web.
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for
personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are
not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies
bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to
republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific
permission and/or a fee.
ASIA CCS’13, May 8–10, 2013, Hangzhou, China.
Copyright 2013 ACM 978-1-4503-1767-2/13/05 ...$15.00.
It also forms a fertile ground for a variety of research eﬀorts.
The information shared on OSNs can be classiﬁed into two
broad categories, private (shared with a limited set of users)
and public (shared with the whole world). Prior research
shows that the information shared with a limited set of users
can leak undisclosed privacy attributes, e.g., users’ interests
and even sexual orientation [28, 21]. Authors of [4] crawled
Facebook users’ personal proﬁles to infer users’ undisclosed
interests. However, getting access to such information (with-
out explicit permission) that is shared with a limited set of
users is non-trivial as it is not available to public via any
APIs. Moreover, OSNs are adopting ways to restrict crawl-
ing unless explicit permission is granted [25, 31].
In comparison to the information available only to a lim-
ited set of users, public information is readily available. In
many cases APIs are provided by OSNs for anyone to eﬃ-
ciently download such public data. Facebook, for example,
has made all the fan pages public by default. Access to the
data of these pages can be conveniently obtained through
Graph APIs [8]. It is generally believed that these pub-
lic pages hardly contain any secret information, and mining
some useful information from them is not easy mainly due
to the large amount of noise contained in the heterogeneous
pages, and the huge amount of unstructured data involved.
For example, Facebook has little control on the titles and
descriptions of fan pages; posts from users may contain text
and multimedia content; users use a lot of short sentences
and slang (e.g., “LOL”, “LMAO”, etc); oﬀ-topic discussions
go on frequently (e.g., on a “Jazz” page, we found users dis-
cussing the latest soccer game). All this adds to the noise in
public data on OSNs. Moreover, almost 15 percent of user-
submitted content on large Facebook fan pages is spam [10].
Such noise and the huge amount of unstructured data to be
processed usually makes mining interesting information not
practical.
In this paper, we show that this belief might not be true
in certain aspect. In particular, we show how we use publicly
available data from Facebook to infer users’ interests that
are usually only on their personal proﬁle pages. We make use
of the graph APIs provided by Facebook to obtain public fan
pages [7]. As these pages are public irrespective of the users’
privacy settings, an attacker can grab the unique proﬁle IDs
of those who have interacted with the page. We show that
by aggregating diﬀerent interests of the users found across
diﬀerent pages, one could build users’ interests proﬁles from
the public data without gaining access to the personal pro-
ﬁle pages of any of the users. This collective information can
be used in many ways including targeted spamming, show-
ing ads without the consent of users, or even breaking into
speciﬁc authentication systems, in our case preference based
authentication [17]. A system based on user preferences was
proposed in order to reduce the vulnerability to data-mining
and maximize the success rate of legitimate reset attempts.
The viability of such an approach is supported by ﬁndings in
psychology, showing that personal preferences remain stable
for a long period of time.
To demonstrate the security and privacy implication of
this, we base our experiments on mining personal interests
to break into Blue MoonTM [15] introduced by RavenWhite
as a backup authentication system to provide better secu-
rity and usability. From the dataset in our experiments in-
volving 1.1 million diﬀerent user IDs from 34,000 Facebook
public pages, we detected 80,097 (6.89%) users with two
or more interests. Out of these 80,097 users, there are 66
who have been found with more than 8 interests, which is
enough to break their corresponding Blue Moon accounts (if
they have) with reasonable accuracy under certain assump-
tions. In one case, we were able to build a user proﬁle with
as many as 22 interests by mining the data we collected.
We also present valuable lessons we learned in our experi-
ments, among which the most notable one being that users’
sentiment orientation might not be inclined towards the sen-
timent orientation of the page i.e. simply liking a page does
not corroborate enough that the user is really interested in
the page. Therefore, we performed sentiment mining to ﬁnd
out the actual sentiment orientation of the user.
In summary, this paper makes the following contributions.
• We use publicly available data on Facebook to infer
users’ interests and aggregate this information across
diﬀerent pages. This diﬀers from prior research as we
do not use user’s personal data posted on their proﬁle
page (e.g., gender, current location, activities, inter-
ests, etc.).
• We ﬁnd that liking a page does not corroborate a user’s
inclination towards a page or interest category. We
performed an in-depth analysis (sentiment) using text
mining to ﬁnd the real sentiment orientation or polar-
ity (like or dislike) of the user towards a page and an
interest.
• We use Facebook’s public Graph API [8] to obtain
the public pages. Unlike crawling which is usually re-
stricted in its usage by OSNs to a small number of
partners, our method could be easily used by anyone
with little restriction.
• We demonstrate the severe implication of interests min-
ing by showing that interests inferred from the public
data can be used to exploit a previously proposed pref-
erence based authentication system.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We provide
background and related work in Section 2 where we show
some of the important prior work to abuse OSNs. We ex-
plain our technique to mine user interests from Facebook
public pages in Section 3, and report experimental results
in Section 4. We then discuss the limitations and errors
that could have occurred in our technique in Section 5 and
conclude the paper in Section 6.
2. RELATED WORK AND BACKGROUND
In this section, we ﬁrst discuss related work in obtaining
a user’s private information by abusing OSNs in general.
After that, we discuss the more speciﬁc interests inference
techniques in social networks.
2.1 Abusing OSN data
With the increasing popularity of OSNs, people start to
ﬁnd ways of abusing it, e.g., illegitimate use by spammers
with ad deals. In this paper, we focus on the abuse in
which a user’s privacy attributes are inferred from informa-
tion hosted on OSNs. In general, attackers could base their
attacks on two types of data obtained in diﬀerent ways.
One is to use restricted pages by crawling. Prior re-
search shows that information on restricted pages (shared
with a limited set of users) can leak undisclosed privacy at-
tributes about the users [28, 21]. Existing techniques have
demonstrated that private information can be crawled to
obtain attributes like mother’s maiden name, date of birth,
hometown, ﬁrst school attended to break into backup au-
thentication mechanisms that are based on such privacy
attributes [16]. Attackers can also correlate information
from diﬀerent OSNs to retrieve undisclosed attributes of the
users [21]. Authors of [4] crawled users’ personal proﬁles of
Facebook to infer their undisclosed interests. [3] describes
how an attacker could query popular social networks for reg-
istered e-mail addresses on a large scale and information
from diﬀerent social networks can be aggregated to launch
sophisticated and targeted attacks.
An important limitation to using restricted pages by crawl-
ing is that most OSNs restrict crawling to a small number
of partners only. That is, crawling restricted pages is not a
technique available to general attackers.
The other type of data to use is public pages. As com-
pared to crawling restricted pages on OSNs, anyone can use
a legitimate channel (usually by using public APIs provided
by OSNs) to gather public information. Although these pub-
lic pages are more readily available for anyone to analyze, as
pointed out in Section 1, it is generally believed that min-
ing interesting private information from these public pages
is diﬃcult due to the noise in it and the huge amount of
unstructured data to be analyzed. In this paper, we show
that mining users’ otherwise undisclosed interests from pub-
lic pages on OSNs is, in fact, practical.
There are strong security and privacy implications to such
abuse of OSN data because the private information mined
could potentially be used to break existing authentication
systems, typically those that use challenge questions as a
backup to the main authentication mechanism. In Table 1,
we highlight noticeable diﬀerences between this work and
prior research. Previous work has shown that OSN data and
public databases can be used to infer or guess sensitive infor-
mation about users [28, 21]. A number of incidents, e.g., in
2008 the Republican vice presidential nominee Sarah Palin’s
email account was compromised by an attacker who guessed
her personal authentication question (where did you meet
your spouse?) [26], in 2009 a vandal successfully guessed a
Twitter executive’s password and leaked the company’s in-
ternal documents [6], have shown the severe damage such
attacks could have. Personal authentication questions are
usually a weaker link in authentication systems [24]. Au-
thors show that answers to predeﬁned questions can be eas-
ily guessed or obtained from OSNs [24]. Instead of speciﬁc
# Paper Datasets source Dataset
type
Count Inferred informa-
tion
Collected infor-
mation
Dataset
gathering
technique
1
Mislove et
al. [21]
Rice University
Facebook network
Personal
proﬁles
6,156
Missing attribute on
personal proﬁle page
Attributes of
others (friends
etc.)
Crawling
New Orleans Face-
book network
Personal
proﬁles
90,269
Crawling
2
Chaabane
et al. [4]
Facebook
Personal
proﬁles
104,000
Gender, Relationship
status, Country-level
location and Age
Interests
Crawling
Volunteers from
Facebook
Personal
proﬁles
200 Voluntarily
provided
3
Lindamood
et al. [20]
LiveJournal
Personal
proﬁles
66,766
Nodes in the social
graph
Friendship rela-
tions
Crawling
4
Goga et
al. [13]
Twitter
Personal
proﬁles
93,839
Correlating missing
attributes
Proﬁle and
privacy
information
Friend-
ﬁnder
Flicker 59,476
Yelp 24,176
5
Avello et
al. [12]
Twitter
Personal
Proﬁles
4.98M
Sex, age, political
orientation, religious
aﬃliation, race
Personal details
and tweets
Crawling
Tweets 27.9M
6
Zheleva et
al. [33]
Flicker
Personal
Proﬁles
9,179 Location
Information on
proﬁle
Crawling
Facebook
Personal
Proﬁles
1,598 Gender, political orien-
tation
Information on
proﬁle
Crawling
Dogster
Dog Pro-
ﬁles
2,632 Breed category
Information on
proﬁle
Crawling
BibSonomy
Personal
Proﬁles
31,715 Spammer
Information on
proﬁle
N/A
7 This paper Facebook
Public
pages
34,000
Interests Public page’s data API
Personal
proﬁles
1.1M
Table 1: Comparison with the related work
attack incidents where one or two particular accounts are
compromised, our work presented in this paper shows an
attack to the authentication system and evaluates the ex-
tent to which thousands of users of such a system could be
attacked.
2.2 Interests mining from OSN data
This paper focuses on personal interests mining because
personal interest is one of the most popular choices used in
challenge questions. Authors of [22] leverage on the friend-
ship network to mine users’ interests. [11] employs feature
engineering to generate hand-crafted meta-descriptors as ﬁn-
gerprints for a user. However, such models alone may not
derive the complete interest list of any user [32]. [19, 5] resort
to collaborative ﬁltering techniques to proﬁle user interests
by collaboratively uncovering user behaviors.
The“Like” function on OSN provides a more intuitive way
of estimating user interests as compared to non-direct in-
dicators such as user-service interactions. Clicking on the
“Like”/“Dislike” button associated with an object usually
indicates that (s)he is highly interested/disinterested in the
object [32]. Recent approaches like LikeMiner [18] assumes
that clicking the “like”button demonstrates the user’s liking
towards the object. In this paper, we show complications
in using such an assumption on large datasets and propose
solutions to it.
3. INTERESTS INFERENCE
Although users understand that public pages are for ev-
eryone to view and should not contain sensitive or private
information, these pages nevertheless reveal what users do
and what users think. Therefore, it is probably not diﬃcult
to be convinced that such pages still contain private infor-
mation, probably indirectly and to a limited degree, e.g., by
reﬂecting what users like and dislike. This paper is not to
argue this, but to rather investigate how practical it is to
mine interesting personal interests from the large amount
of unstructured data on public pages that contain a lot of
noise.
To do this, we ﬁrst introduce the data source on which our
analysis is performed, i.e., the public pages on Facebook (see
Section 3.1). Section 3.2 presents our methodology to fetch
information from these public pages. Finally, we present
our methodology to infer users’ interests (i.e. likes and dis-
likes) for diﬀerent categories (e.g., music, cars, sports) in
Section 3.3.
3.1 Facebook Page Layout
A Facebook Page is a public proﬁle where users can talk
(and comment/like) about a particular topic. As shown in
Figure 1, it usually contains many attributes including title,
page description, proﬁle picture, wall posts, likes, etc. Any
registered user can create a page and by default all Face-
book pages are public. Please note that anyone can view
the page, however, to interact with a page (i.e. comment or
post something), a registered Facebook user must “like” it
ﬁrst by pressing the like button on the page. After liking the
page, the user can post a message/link/photo/video which
will appear on the wall of that page. Other users who have
already liked that page can post comments on a post, like
the post, etc.
As an illustration, Figure 1 shows a Facebook page “LSU
Football” with one post “LSU Tigers in the NFL – Week
10” from the user “LSU Football”. 244 users have liked that
post; a user has commented on it and 4 users have liked it.
As shown in Figure 2, in general, a public page P is a
collection of many attributes. First, there is a title and de-
scription t of the page. Each page P may contain a number
of posts p1, p2, etc. Each post pi may have a few likes Li1,
Li2, etc. and a few comments c
i
1, c
i
2, etc. Each comment c
i
j
might have a few likes lij,1, l
i
j,2, etc.
Figure 2: Structure of a Facebook page
3.2 Data collection
As discussed in Section 2, since we make use of public
pages only, we can use Facebook’s public Graph API to fetch
data of any Facebook public page. Information that we man-
age to fetch for each page includes its title and description
t, all posts pi, comments cij and likes L
i
m of each post, as
well as likes of each comment lij,k.
A small diﬃculty we faced was the authentication needed
to use the Graph API. To fetch pages from Facebook us-
ing Graph API, one requires an authentication code. This
authentication code is generally provided to Facebook appli-
cations for a limited amount of time. However, we did not
build any Facebook application to obtain this authentication
code. Instead, we created a php script to automatically login
to Facebook and then parse the webpage returned at the fol-
lowing URL and look for the authentication code https://
developers.facebook.com/tools/access_token/. Access
token is only granted for a limited time, therefore this pro-
cess can be repeated whenever the access token is expired.
This work around was possible at the time of writing this
paper.
There are limitations in using the public APIs only. For
example, we were not able to obtain the IDs of those people
who only liked the page and did not comment or posted
anything on the page. We were also limited by the number
of API calls we can make in a certain duration. At the time
when the experiments were conducted, Facebook used to
provide the list of users who liked a page, this feature is not
supported anymore.
3.3 Automated profiling with attributes
In this subsection, we ﬁrst present how we analyze an
individual attribute on a Facebook page to ﬁgure out if a
user has personal interests in the topic covered in that page.
This might sound simple, as the user’s interaction with the
attributes of a page reveals some inclination towards that
page. For example, if a user posts a positive message on the
wall of a soccer page, it can be inferred that the user may be
interested in soccer. For this we propose a technique SPM
(SimPle Mining) to mine the information of users’ interest
(see Section 3.3.1). However, we also observed during our
analysis that many users may“like”a page even though they
are not interested in the corresponding topic, or if they have
strong negative opinions on the topic. To solve this prob-
lem, in Section 3.3.2 we propose a more advanced technique
called SOM (Sentiment Oriented Mining) to use sentiment
analysis of the attributes to ﬁnd the actual sentiment orien-
tation of the users.
3.3.1 SPM: SimPle Mining
In SPM, we simply assume that a user’s involvement in
any of the attributes of P in whichever way indicates that the
user has a same interest on the topic of the page, which can
be inferred from t. For example, if a user likes a comment
or adds a comment on a post on P , then we believe that
the user is interested in P . If multiple users have interacted
with P , we add all these users into the set u=q which denotes
the set of users who are interested in P about the interest
q.
SPM is simple, but can easily introduce errors to u=q be-
cause there could be a group of users of P (denoted u=q ) who
hold an opinion opposite to the focus of P . For example, a
user who liked the cats page posted the following posts “I
hate cats”, “Lewis is a mad cat”, “go doggies cats are crap”
etc. They “liked” the page not because they really like it,
but simply because Facebook does not allow them to add a
post until they “like” it. To minimize this noise, we perform
sentiment mining on textual data to ﬁnd out the inclination
of all users towards that page. See the following section for
details.
3.3.2 SOM: Sentiment Oriented Mining
Sentiment analysis is the task of identifying positive and
negative opinions, emotions, and evaluations [30]. Sentiment
analysis has been used in many ﬁelds where users have sub-
jective agenda such as movie reviews [23]. Intuitively, the
content of the posts/comments should be accounted in de-
riving the users’ interest. Hence, the polarity of the senti-
ment information of the text aids in conforming the users’
interest.
We ﬁrst deﬁne two sets of attributes on a Facebook page
P . AC = {t, p, c } is the set of text-based attributes which
consists of text, while AD = {L, l } is the set of dependent
attributes which does not contain text. We separate these
Figure 1: A public Facebook Page
attributes into two groups because those that consist of text
can go through a more thorough sentiment analysis on the
text, while attributes of the other set are more dependent
on the post or comment upon which the “like” was applied.
Sentiment analysis on AC .
We propose to use lexicon approach [14], which is one of
the most popular methods used in sentiment analysis to de-
tect the opinion bearing words. Lexicon approach concerns
the use of lexical resources such as a dictionary of opinion-
ated terms or opinion words. Collectively, they are called
the opinion lexicon and are instrumental for sentiment anal-
ysis. Opinion words are the words that are commonly used
to express positive (s+) or negative (s−) sentiments. For
example: ‘beautiful’, ‘wonderful’, ‘good’, and ‘amazing’ are
positive opinion words, and ‘bad’, ‘poor’, and ‘terrible’ are
negative opinion words. Many opinion words are adjectives
and adverbs. Sometimes, nouns such as ‘rubbish’, ‘junk’,
and ‘crap’ and verbs such as ‘hate’ and ‘like’ also indicate
opinions. Words which are neither positive nor negative are
marked as neutral (s).
Several opinion lexicons are available and SentiWordNet [2]
is one such resource containing opinion information on terms
extracted from the WordNet database and made publicly
available for research purposes. SentiWordNet is a lexical
resource built on top of WordNet. WordNet [9] is a the-
saurus containing descriptions of terms, and relationships
between terms and part-of-speech (POS) types. For exam-
ple “car” is a subtype of vehicle and car has same concept as
automobile. Hence, a synset (a synonym set) in WordNet
comprises of all the terms with the same concept, e.g., the
synset is car, automobile.
SentiWordNet assigns three sentiment scores to each synset
of WordNet: positivity, negativity, objectivity/neutral. The
sentiscores are in the range of [0, 1] and sum up to 1 for each
triplet. For example, in SentiWordNet, the sentiscore of the
term “good” is (pos, neg, obj) = (0.875, 0.0, 0.125). For our
experiments, the scores are approximated with labels/part-
of-speech of term in the text or sentence. First, the text
is tagged using a standard POS tagger. A standard POS
Tagger [27] is a piece of software that reads text in some
language and assigns parts of speech to each word, such as
noun, verb, adjective, etc. Then the SentiWordNet is used
to get the scores for each term in the text. As our sentiment
analysis is domain independent, we choose the general lexi-
con method as compared to the corpus-based method which
is a domain dependent approach.
We now explain in detail how the sentiment is derived for
the attributes in AC. We call them text-based attributes
because their sentiment orientation is based on the text of
the attribute. For a particular attribute a ∈ AC , we count
the total number of words/phrases with positive sentiment
(ps) and that of words/phrases with negative sentiment (ns)
for all posts and comments he/she has, and use the term-
counting method proposed by [29] to determine Ψ (a) i.e.
the sentiment orientation of a to be
Ψ (a)=
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
s+, if ps > ns
s−, if ps < ns
s, otherwise
Sentiment analysis of AD .
Attributes in AD does not contain text, but they also
contribute to a user’s sentiment orientation. We call them
dependent attributes because their sentiment orientation is
dependent on other attributes. For example, if a user u1 has
a post pi with negative opinion, and user u2 likes that post
Lim, then both u1 and u2 share negative sentiment orienta-
tion on the topic. Similarly, if a user u1 has a comment c
i
j
with positive opinion, and user u2 likes that comment l
i
j,k,
then both u1 and u2 share positive sentiment orientation on
the topic. That is,
Ψ
(
Lim
)
= Ψ
(
pi
)
and
Ψ
(
lij,k
)
= Ψ
(
cij
)
Aggregating interests profiling from multiple attributes
on multiple pages.
A user might have multiple posts, comments, and likes on
a single Facebook page, and multiple Facebook pages might
be about the same interest. Therefore, we have to aggregate
the sentiment analysis results on multiple attributes from
multiple pages in order to ﬁgure out the sentiment orienta-
tion of the user on that interest.
Let A = {a1, a2, ..., ak} be the set of posts, comments,
and likes of a user u on a page P about a particular inter-
est q. For each a ∈ A, we compute the sentiment orienta-
tion. Then, the sentiment orientation of u towards P , SuP is
s+/s− if the number of attributes with positive sentiment is
greater/lesser than the number of attributes with negative
sentiment respectively, otherwise s. Aggregating all Face-
book pages about q, sentiment orientation of u towards q
(Suq ) is s
+/s− if the number pages with positive sentiment
orientation is greater/lesser than the number of pages with
the negative sentiment orientation respectively; otherwise
s. If the sentiment orientation of q and Suq is same, then,
u is added to the set u=q otherwise to u
=
q . That is,
u=q =
{
u ∈ U
∣∣∣ ((Ψ(q) = s+ && Suq ∈ {s+, s})
‖
(
Ψ(q) = s− && Suq = s
−
))}
u=q =
{
u ∈ U
∣∣∣ ((Ψ(q) = s+ && Suq = s−)
‖
(
Ψ(q) = s− && Suq ∈ {s+, s}
))}
4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
To base our analysis on a concrete example, we focus on
breaking Blue MoonTM [15], a backup authentication system
which can be used by a user to reset his lost or forgotten
credentials. For example, if a user forgets his password of
an email account, he or she can use Blue Moon to reset
the password. The idea is to use personal preferences as
challenge questions for authentication. Figure 3 shows a
screenshot of Blue Moon1.
During enrollment, the user is asked to select 8 items
which he likes and 8 items which he dislikes from a list of
76 common interests. During authentication, the user is
presented with a set containing the chosen items in a ran-
domized fashion. The user categorizes the items to like and
dislike. A user is not required to pick all the interests cor-
rectly. Instead, the user just need to correctly categorize
8 items2 to reset his password [17]. To make our analysis
consistent and the evaluation comparable, in the rest of the
paper we assume that a user has to correctly categorize 8
items from the entire list of 76 interests which are shown in
Table 2.
4.1 Dataset Description
In order to attack the Blue Moon system, we assume a
strategy taken by an attacker as follows. He ﬁrst constructs
a set of interests Q from Table 2, and another set Q
′
con-
taining the corresponding negated items like “I hate golf”
and “I hate jazz”. He then leverages the Facebook’s public
Graph API to 1) ﬁnd all public Facebook pages related to
q ∈ {Q∪Q′}; 2) fetch all attribute data of these pages; and
3) use the technique described in Section 3 to ﬁnd u=q and
u=q for all q ∈ {Q ∪Q
′}.
Note that this methodology does not cover all those pages
which are semantically related with the query term. For
example, query term “cars” may not fetch pages of Mer-
cedes, Hyundai or Porche which are indeed the pages of cars.
[4] provides a solution to fetch these pages using semantic
search with the help of an ontology build upon Wikipedia.
We are sure that this could signiﬁcantly increase accuracy
of the attack, although that comes with a price of longer
processing of a large set of pages. We leave this as a future
work to increase the size of the corpus.
Table 3 summarizes the availability of the attributes with
their counts. From 34K pages fetched for 152 categories
we found 2.5 million posts, 7.5 million likes and 4.3 mil-
lion comments on these posts, and 1.3 million likes on those
comments.
Attribute Count
Categories 152
Pages 34,738
Posts 2,538,987
Post likes 7,574,965
Comments 4,381,967
Comment Likes 1,361,361
Table 3: Number of attributes found
We apply both SPM and SOM mining techniques as dis-
cussed in Section 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 respectively to the dataset
PubProf, and discuss the results in the next subsections.
4.2 Inferred interests using SPM
We found a total of 1, 162, 575 unique users whose inter-
ests can be inferred from the pages analyzed. These users
1This image is taken from http://www.ravenwhite.com/
iforgotmypassword.html.
2The threshold where false acceptance rate and false rejec-
tion rate meets.
Figure 3: Blue MoonTM
are the users who have either posted something on the pages,
commented on the posts, or liked the posts/comments. Ap-
plying the SPM approach to our dataset, we detected 80, 097
users with 2 or more interests. This amounts to 6.89% of all
the user IDs collected in our dataset. Figure 4 shows break-
down of users with diﬀerent number of interests found. We
were able to build a user proﬁle with as many as 22 interests.
Figure 4: Inferred interests of the users using SPM
Note that although SPM might not be accurate in ﬁnding
the true sentiment orientation of the user over an interest,
the numbers presented here is not aﬀected by this inaccu-
racy. That is, results presented in Figure 4 actually applies
to SOM as well.
Results show that the number of users whose interests
could be inferred from the public pages is signiﬁcant, and
this would have an important impact on the possibility of
breaking into such users’ Blue Moon account. For example,
for those users found to have two interests, the search space
for breaking into their Blue Moon account is reduced by
about a factor of 3,000 ( C76 2 ). Please also note the dataset
we use represents a tiny subset of the Facebook pages.
4.3 Inferred interests using SOM
In this section, we ﬁrst investigate the inaccuracies when
applying SPM on our data. As discussed in Section 3.3.2,
these inaccuracies happen when users like a page but op-
pose to the topic in it. For example, if the page’s title is “I
hate Cats”, we want to ﬁnd those users who clicked on the
like button on this page, however, actually like cats. Fig-
ure 5 shows the result of our sentiment analysis on all the
comments, in particular, the number of negative comments
diﬀerent user posts. We can observe that about 10% of the
comments posted are negative, meaning that the comment
itself does not have the same sentiment orientation as that
of the page. This suggests that more careful analysis and
handling of the sentiments of posts and comments are im-
portant in order to ﬁnd out the users’ interests.
Figure 5: No. of negative comments posted by users
One interesting ﬁnding we also observe from Figure 5 is
that users who comment a lot (more than 70 comments) tend
to have a smaller percentage of negative comments. It is our
future work to investigate whether the same is observed on
a larger dataset.
To further investigate the result of our sentiment analysis,
Table 4 shows 15 interests with the largest percentage of
users who disagree with the corresponding topic of the page.
|u=q | is the total number of users whose sentiment orientation
is same as that of the category, and |u=q | is the total number
Sports Music Places Interests TV Food
Aerobics Instrumental Garage sales Cars Watching Extreme sports Soul food
Billiards Symphony Bookstores Crafts Documentaries Indian food
Racing Folk Political events Creative writing Watching Auto racing Korean food
Martial arts Easy listening Art galleries Casino Watching News Kosher food
Baseball Gospel Raves Painting Watching Figure skating Middle Eastern food
Soccer Electronics Antique stores Gardening Watching Diving Southwestern food
Golf Classical Museums Religion Watching Baseball French food
Running Jazz Flea markets Politics Watching Hockey Seafood food
Yoga Big Band Libraries Poetry Watching Golf Thai food
Skating Reggae The opera Gaming Game shows Vegetarian food
Cycling Show tunes Politics Reading comics Watching Soccer German food
Hockey Heavy Metal Cats Watching Bowling Mediterranean food
Pool Gambling
Motocross
Basketball
Football
Table 2: User interests domain
of users whose sentiment orientation is opposite to that of
the category. We see that although the inaccuracies from
the SPM technique exist, most pages, especially those with
a large number of users discussing, tend to have less than
10% of the users with negative sentiment orientation.
Category (q) |u=q | (%) |u=q | (%) Total
Hate motocross 25.00 75.00 8
Hate skating 25.00 75.00 4
Hate heavy Metal 14.28 85.72 14
Hate poetry 12.50 87.50 8
Hate hockey 11.53 88.47 26
Watching baseball 11.12 88.88 9
Hate baseball 8.33 91.67 48
Hate basketball 5.52 94.48 181
Hate cats 5.39 94.61 260
Hate religion 5.36 94.64 56
Hate football 3.35 96.65 359
Raves 3.22 96.78 280
Gamble 3.08 96.92 195
Hate cars 3.08 96.92 130
Game shows 2.95 97.05 34
Table 4: The percentage of users whose sentiment
orientation is not inclined / inclined towards the sen-
timent orientation of the page across all interests
categories.
Another interesting observation is that most of the entries
in Table 4 are of pages with a negative sentiment, i.e., q is
“Hate xxx”. We believe that it is because there are more
people who want to voice out their disagreement with such
pages than people who disagree with pages with a positive
sentiment.
4.4 Comparing SPM and SOM
Table 5 shows the number of users found liking/disliking
selected categories for both the SPM and SOM techniques.
We only show a few categories with the largest discrepancies
due to space constraint. Note that these are accumulated
categories, e.g., we combined all 12 musical categories like
jazz, classical, etc.
Results show that although there are users who like the
page while having a diﬀerent sentiment orientation as shown
in the previous subsection, these users are minorities, and
that is why we do not see a large discrepancy between results
from SPM and SOM. In this respect results here seem to be
consistent with those presented in Table 4.
Also, we observe that sports is the most popular category
where 12.62% of users are inclined to the sports. These
numbers could potentially be used to obtain the a priori
probability for an unknown user having diﬀerent interests,
and subsequently used in attacking the Blue Moon system.
We leave more detailed analysis on this for our future work.
Main Category #Users using
SPM
#Users using
SOM
Like Sports 146756 145141
Like Music 29597 29255
Like General 65354 64571
Like Entertainment 163 158
Like Food 4031 3990
Do not like Sports 1120 1079
Do not like Music 30 28
Do not like General 825 800
Table 5: Likes and Dislikes
4.5 Errors in sentiment analysis
As text mining is prone to errors, in this section we eval-
uate the correctness of our SOM approach in detecting the
correct sentiment orientation. We manually label 300 sen-
tences randomly chosen from various categories including
sports, music, religion, politics, cats, and food. An indepen-
dent human annotator then labels each sentence to either
s+, s or s− depending on his/her understanding of the
sentence. We then evaluate SentiWordNet’s accuracy using
precision metrics (automated labeling against manually an-
notated labels). This measure have been commonly used to
evaluate the accuracy of various retrieval, classiﬁcation, and
mining algorithms. Precision refers to the proportion of true
positives over the sum of the true positives and false posi-
tives. The sentiment mining technique provided an overall
accuracy of 69.33%, see Table 6 where the diagonal ﬁgures
represent the accurate labeling, while oﬀ diagonal ﬁgures
represent false positives.
Estimated/Sentiwordnet
s+ s s−
Actual/Human
s+ 66.33 17.35 16.33
s 23.68 63.16 13.16
s− 18.25 06.35 73.02
Table 6: Confusion matrix for sentiment (%)
Sentiment analysis failed for conjugate and multi sen-
tences. For example, “As far as intelligence goes cats have
a diﬀerent kind of intelligence than that of dogs. They can
MANIPULATE their environment to SURVIVE can hunt
on their own and...” is labeled negative and “really no 1
can say our governance in 9ja is understood... we are just
driven here and there no prosperous direction... we really
don’t know... Im shot of words 4 my dear country” is la-
beled as positive. Sentiment approach also failed for sarcas-
tic statements like “GREAT.. now I can not get ONLINE...”
which has been labeled positive.
The inaccurate estimation of positive to negative or nega-
tive to positive labels has more impact on building the user
proﬁle. The neutral messages are overwritten by the page
polarity and hence no impact on user proﬁle.
4.6 Concentrated group with ground truth
We tried to get some ground truth to be compared with
the results obtained. We chose 450 users from u= obtained
using the SPM approach with the largest number of interests
inferred (more than 4 in particular). Out of the 450 user
proﬁles, 47 have either been deactivated or deleted. We
manually sent Facebook friend requests and messages to the
remaining 403 Facebook users to know more about their
interests in certain categories. In particular, we provided the
user with a list of all the inferred interests (using SPM) of the
user and asked him/her to classify into three categories i.e.
s+, s−, s. Due to privacy settings imposed by many users,
we were only able to send 334 friend request (70 accepted)
and 299 messages (15 replied back).
We expected those who accepted our friend request would
reply to our messages sent; however, there were only 12 (out
of 70) who replied to our message. 56 did not reply and
we were not able to send message to 2 users because of the
privacy settings imposed by them.
Majority users (212) neither accepted our friend request
nor responded to our message sent. There were 2 partic-
ipants who did not accepted our friend request but still
replied to the message. Please refer to Table 7 for a sum-
mary of the responses we got.
Disallow
Message
Allow Message
No reply Replied
Friend req. not allowed 52 16 1
Friend req.
allowed
Not added 50 212 2
Added 2 56 12
Table 7: Users category settings in VolProf
We take the responses of those 15 users who replied to
our messages and compared them with the corresponding
Figure 6: Users Interest from VolProf
interests inferred using SPM. Figure 6 shows the percentage
of the correctly inferred interests of these users. It shows
that we were able to infer approximately half (7 out of 15)
of the users’ interests with 100% accuracy. Also, we can
see from the ﬁgure that at least two-third of the interests
are inferred correctly for all the 15 users. Although we did
not manage to get a larger pool of people with ground truth
due to the manual work involved, available data seems to
suggest that our technique provides reasonable accuracy in
inferring users’ interests from public pages on Facebook.
5. DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS
In this section we ﬁrst discuss another threat model and
results under this new threat model with our manual anal-
ysis. We then discuss other factors that could have con-
tributed to inaccuracies and point out limitations in our re-
sults.
5.1 A different threat model
Apart from the threat model discussed so far, we discuss
the strategy that can be adopted by an attacker who has ac-
cess to all the pages the victim has liked on Facebook. The
objective of the attack is still to guess the Blue MoonTM
categories. This is a reasonable threat model when the at-
tacker is a malicious app or some close friend/colleague of
the victim. For example, spouses check their partners ac-
counts without their permission, which can lead to divorces
later on [1]. Partners are usually friends on Facebook who
have access to most of the information including “likes” etc.
We conducted a small experiment by inviting some users
to the lab and collecting their page “likes” (only after seek-
ing their permission). We hired two research assistants to
independently categorize these pages according to the Blue
MoonTM categories. This manual analysis on one user hav-
ing the highest (926) number of page likes shows that 71
out of 926 pages can be categorized to Blue MoonTM cate-
gories. These 71 pages fall into 15 Blue MoonTM categories.
This shows that an attacker who has access to the user’s
like pages could possibly use them to break into the victim’s
Blue MoonTM system.
5.2 Limitations
One of the most important contribution to inaccuracies in
our analysis is noise in the public pages on Facebook. This
noise could come from advertisements, spamming in general,
conversations in comments, and others.
Facebook is popular marketing media and some users are
actually advertisers. For example, a person selling Nike
shoes may post his ad in all the categories corresponding
to sports. Our system might therefore believe that this user
has an interest in sports. To have a sense on the noise level,
we search for advertisements in selected categories by ran-
domly choosing some posts and manually labeling them as
advertisements. Table 8 shows the number of advertisements
found in a number of posts for selected categories.
Category No of posts scanned % of Ads found
Sports 1,348 0.445
Food 2,312 0.346
Cats 2,312 0.216
Music 7,000 0.171
Politics 9,928 0.060
Table 8: Percentage of Advertisement posts
It appears that the noise level in our dataset is very low,
however, our manual process in ﬁnding advertisements might
be error prone, too. Another step we took to minimize this
error was to manually check whether the users inferred with
more than eight interests are real users. Our simple manual
checking revealed that except a few users whose accounts
had been deactivated or deleted, all of them seem to be le-
gitimate. We also ﬁltered oﬀ users who posted same message
in more than four pages.
We have seen many people get into their personal con-
versations on public pages that are not related to the topic
of the page. Unfortunately we do not ﬁnd a scalable way
of ﬁltering out such noise, and therefore it might have con-
tributed to errors made.
There are also limitations in the techniques that we use.
First, we use a context independent text mining algorithm.
This limits our capability in analyzing the sentiment of cer-
tain pages, e.g., “Lets help the dogs in the streets and kick
the cats.” The sentiment scoring without context will fail
to identify the user interest in this example. To solve this
problem, we need additional scoring models that can handle
the sentiment with the context.
Second, we only managed to obtain ground truth for a
small set of users. We wish we could ﬁnd a better approach
to obtain the ground truth, but sending out message to a
large number of users had one of our Facebook account sus-
pended, and that was why we did not go further to target a
larger group.
Last but not the least, manual work was involved in a
number of steps in our experiments, including evaluation
of the accuracy of sentiment analysis, spam detection, etc.
This manual work could potentially introduce errors into the
evaluation.
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we raised two important questions, as why
public information is made public? And is there any in-
formation that can be mined to break preference based au-
thentication. We present two mining based approaches to
predict undisclosed users’ interests. Using only simple min-
ing approach we extracted unobservable Interest topics by
analyzing the corpus of Interests obtained via legitimate use
of Graph API provided by Facebook. From our experiments,
we were able to disclose 22 interests of a user and found more
than 80,097 users with at least more than 2 interests. We
also show how this inferred information can be used to break
preference based backup authentication system. We also
demonstrated that simply liking a Facebook page does not
imply the users’ inclination towards that page. We showed
that there exists many users who liked a Facebook page,
however they post negative comments on the page. We also
compared our work with prior research work which involves
crawling personal proﬁles (either public or private). In fu-
ture, we would like to improve our mining approach to infer
more privacy attributes apart from interests.
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